“EUROPEAN DEBT CRISIS”, THE MOST COMMONLY DISCUSSED MATTER TODAY IN
FINANCIAL WORLD AS WELL IN JOB MARKETS. WHAT IS IT EXACTALY? AND HOW IT
STARTED? IS IT THE RESULTANT EFFECT OF A COUPLE OF YEARS PROBLEM OR A LONG
STRETCHED PROBLEM?
All these queries will be cleared in this Article. Hold your breath
this Crisis is not a couple of years old, in fact it was spreading its roots
tight since the Year 2000, yes MORE THAN A DECADE!!!
Meaning of Some Terms before we Start what is EUROPEAN DEBT CRISIS AND
HOW IT ALL STARTED
Bailout: As a person is when arrested and seeks a Bail to come out
from that arrest for some time. In the same way when a Company or a Country is
when provided with an emergency financial help so that they keep running and
working as before is called a Bailout. In India, Kingfisher Airlines is the
recent example of this.
Austerity Measures / Plans: Austerity is
a policy of deficit-cutting, lower spending, and a
reduction in the amount of benefits and public services provided. Austerity
policies are often used by governments to reduce their deficit spending while
sometimes coupled with increases in taxes to pay back creditors to
reduce debt.
European Financial Stability
Facility (EFSF): It is a special purpose
vehicle financed by members of the eurozone to fight
the European sovereign debt crisis. It was agreed by the 27 member
states of the European Union on 9 May 2010, aiming at preserving
financial stability in Europe by providing financial assistance to eurozone states
in economic difficulty.
Contagion: The likelihood that significant economic changes
in one country will spread to other countries. Contagion can refer to
the spread of either economic booms or economic crises throughout a geographic
region. Contagion has become a more prominent phenomenon as the global economy
has grown and economies within certain geographic regions have become more
correlated with one another.
HOW IT ALL STARTED?
In 1958, an organisation called
European Coal and Steel Community was formed. This evolved into the European
Union (EU) which was established by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. The European
Union introduced the euro on January 1, 1999. On this day, 11 member countries
of the EU started using euro as their currency. It benefited countries such as
Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain (together now known as the PIIGS).
Before these countries started to
use the euro as a currency, they had to borrow money at interest rates much
higher than the rates at which a country like Germany borrowed. When these
countries started to use the euro they could borrow money at interest rates
close to that of Germany, which was economically the best managed country in
the EU.
OVERBURDENED DEBT
The rest of Europe, in effect,
used Germany's credit rating to indulge its material desires. They borrowed as
cheaply as Germans could to buy stuff they couldn't afford.
Also other than the low interest
rates, the inflation in the PIIGS countries was higher than the rate of
interest. It means that if the borrowing rate is 3 per cent while
inflation is 4 per cent you're effectively borrowing for 1 per cent less than
inflation. You're being paid to borrow.
And the European peripheral
countries (PIIGS) racked up enormous amount of debt in euros. Taking the case
of Greece, their debt currently amounts to around 160 per cent of their GDP. With
low interest rates these countries went on a borrowing spree and since they
borrowed much more than their repayment capacity is, they are in a mess. Greece
is the smallest of these countries and is in the biggest mess.
Other than the citizens, the
governments also started to borrow. This helped politicians keep their
constituency of voters happy.
GREECE
Taking the case of Greece, a job
which now pays 55,000 euros in Germany, pays 70,000 euros in Greece, even with
the fact that Germany is a more productive nation. To get around pay restraints
in the calendar year the Greek government simply paid employees a 13th and even
14th monthly salary -- months that didn't exist.
The Greek government categorizes
certain jobs as arduous. These jobs have a retirement age of 55 for men and 50
for women. As this is also the moment when the state begins to shovel out
generous pensions, more than 600 Greek professions somehow managed to get
themselves classified as arduous: hairdressers, radio announcers, musicians.
It means more and more borrowing by the government, when
they already have so much debt.
SPAIN
Taking the case of Spain, it had the
biggest housing bubble in the world. To put things in perspective, Spain now
has as many unsold homes as the United States, even though the US is six times
bigger. Most of these new homes were financed with capital from abroad. Spain's
real estate debt comes to around 50 per cent of its GDP.
Every time there are default
threats to the Countries, the European Central Bank (ECB), helps out with a
bailout. Since the start of the financial crisis ECB has bought around $80
billion of Greek and Irish and Portuguese government bonds, and lent another
$450 billion or so to various European governments and European banks,
accepting virtually any collateral, including Greek government bonds. Of the
126 countries with rated debt, Greece now ranked 126th: the Greeks were
officially regarded as the least likely people on the planet to repay their
debts.
Germany keeps contributing the
ECB rescue fund. The German government gives money to the rescue fund so that
it can give money to the Irish government so that the Irish government can give
money to Irish banks so the Irish banks can repay their loans to the German
banks. In case of Greece, a lot of German and French banks which have lent
money will be in trouble if Greece defaults.
HUNGARY
In 2004, interest rates in Hungary
were at 12.5 per cent. This meant borrowing money was extremely expensive.
In Austria, the banks had started
to offer loans and mortgages to their customers in Swiss francs. Rates in
Austria, at 2 per cent, may have been lower than in Hungary, but in Switzerland,
they were even lower at around 0.5 per cent. Why would Austrians borrow at 2
per cent when they could just as easily borrow at 0.5% per cent?
The same question applied to
Hungarians, except that the difference was much bigger. So the Austrian banks,
many of which also had branches in Hungary began to engage in the same business
there, lending to Hungarian borrowers.
Now Austrian banks have lent 140
per cent of their GDP to countries like Hungary. Even though Hungary has put in
austerity measures and is trying to repay, if there was a blow up, the Austrian
government wouldn't be able to save the banks and ECB might have to step in.
Similarly, Swedish banks have
also lent a lot of money to Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, countries which
aspire to have Euro as their currency some day.
ITALY
Using the example of Italy, Households
and firms, anticipating that domestic deposits would be redenominated into the
lira (Italy's currency before it started using the euro), which would then lose
value against the euro, would shift their deposits to other euro-area banks. A
system-wide bank run would follow. Investors anticipating that their claims on
the Italian government would be redenominated into lira would shift into claims
on other euro-area governments, leading to a bond market crisis . . . this
would be the mother of all financial crises.
WHAT IS EXACTALY EUROPEAN DEBT DEAL?
Euro as a currency started
operating on January 1, 1999. Before that the German currency -- Deutschemark
-- used to be the premier currency of Europe. The Euro inherited the strength
of the deutschemark. The world looked at the Euro as the new Deutschemark.
The Greek government over the
years borrowed a lot of money to finance its fiscal deficit, which is the
difference between what a government earns and what a government spends. A lot
of this borrowing was from private investors like German banks to whom the
Greek government currently owes Euro 8.6 billion.
So these private creditors of the
Greek government have now agreed to take a 50 per cent haircut. It basically
means is that for every 100 Euro owed to them, they have agreed to accept 50
Euro as repayment, primarily in the hope that Greece at least repays 50 per
cent of what it owes to them.
So Greece is defaulting, though
technically and we call it a haircut. The hope is that by doing this, Greek
debt will come down to manageable proportions. Experts who have come up with
this plan expect Greek debt to come down to around 120 per cent of its gross
domestic product (GDP) in 2020, because of this plan. Otherwise it would have
ballooned to around 180 per cent of its GDP.
If the German banks take a 50 per
cent haircut on their outstanding debt of Euro 8.6 billion they lose around
Euro 4.3 billion. A lot of money has been lent to the private sector in Greece.
And if the government of a country is defaulting, how could one expect the
private sector to pay up?
Greece is not the only country
which owes money to Germany. Spain owes around $238 billion to Germany.
Italy, Ireland and Portugal owe $190 billion, $184 billion and $47 billion,
respectively.
These countries might turn around
and say why we don’t get a haircut on our debt as well. And then there will be
a bigger problem given that these countries are bigger and the money they owe
to Germany is considerably larger.
Angela Merkel, the German
Chancellor is supporting this policy due to an economic reason. Before Euro
became a common currency across Europe, German exports stood at around $487
billion in 1995. In 1999, the first year of the Euro being used as a currency
the exports were at Euro 469 billion. Next year they increased to Euro 548
billion. And now they stand at Euro 1 trillion. And all this was because of
Euro being used as a currency.
Using Euro as a common currency
took away the cost of dealing with multiple currencies and thus helped Germany
expand its exports to its European neighbours big time. Also with a common
currency at play, exchange rate fluctuations which play an important part in
the export game, no longer mattered and what really mattered was the cost of
production.
Since the beginning of the Euro
in 1999, Germany has become some 30 per cent more productive than Greece. Very
roughly, that means it costs 30 per cent more to produce the same amount of
goods in Greece than in Germany. That is why Greece imports $64 billion and
exports only $21 billion.
So the way it works is that
German banks lend to other countries in Europe at low interest rates and they,
in turn, buy German goods and services which are extremely competitively priced
as well as of good quality.
And that is why Germany is
interested in rescuing these countries or at least showing that it is trying to
do something about it. Because if these countries in Europe collapse, then
German exports will collapse as well.
One solution bandied around is
that these countries which are in severe debt to Germany should be asked to
stop using the Euro as its currency. But if they stop using the Euro as a
currency, then the huge export advantage which Germany has had because of the
Euro will also end. So Germany is jammed in from both sides.
A DILEMMA
The euro zone is a hybrid: a
single currency with 17 national fiscal and economic policies. It has no common
treasury, no tax-raising powers, no joint bonds and no central bank acting as
lender of last resort. In good times, this did not matter. But in the worst
financial crisis in decades, the flaws are glaring.
Countries cannot quit the euro
without extreme economic pain, but nor is it easy to fix. Vetoes may be needed
to maintain democratic consent, even if they make for poor crisis management. A
blockage in one country endangers all. The markets are testing the ambiguities
to destruction. Vague promises to “do whatever it takes” to save the euro are
not enough. Will the ECB deploy its full resources to stop the crisis? How much
intrusion into national policies are Greece and Italy ready to accept? How far
is Germany willing to extend its credit? Will the euro zone’s states hang
together or hang separately?
These are big questions,
affecting the nature of the state, sovereignty and democracy.
OLD DEBTS DOG EUROPE’s BANKS
European banks are sitting on
heaps of exotic mortgage products and other risky assets that predate the
financial crisis, adding to pressure on lenders that also are holding large
quantities of euro-zone government debt.
Four years after instruments like
"collateralized debt obligations" and "leveraged loans"
became dirty words because of the massive losses they inflicted on holders,
European banks still own tens of billions of euros of such assets. They also
have sizable portfolios of U.S. commercial real-estate loans and subprime
mortgages that could remain under pressure until the global economy recovers.
While the assets largely
originated in the U.S. financial system, top American banks have moved faster
than their European counterparts to rid themselves of the majority of such
detritus.
Sixteen top European banks are
holding a total of about €386 billion ($532 billion) of potentially suspect
credit-market and real-estate assets. That's more than the €339 billion of
Greek, Irish, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish government debt that those same
banks were holding at the end of last year, according to European "stress
test" data.
The old credit-market assets
might turn out to be harmless for the banks. If real-estate markets hold steady
or strengthen, for example, instruments made up of home loans could gain value
and generate a steady stream of cash payments for their holders.
Still, the hefty holdings of debt
from before the 2008 financial crisis compound the challenge facing the
Continent's banks.
Many are holding tens of billions
of euros of bonds issued by financially shaky countries. They are holding
hundreds of billions more in loans to customers in those same countries, which
are likely to go bad at an increasing clip if Europe's economy continues to
struggle.
The situation is heightening
fears that the banks lack enough capital to absorb potential losses and could
require government support.
The banks generally have been
holding the assets since before the financial crisis got under way four years
ago, a time when real-estate assets in general had much higher prices. Some
banks haven't fully written down these loans to reflect their current market
values.
European banks, on average, have
roughly halved their stockpiles of the legacy assets since 2007. Meanwhile, the
top three U.S. banks—Bank of America Corp., Citigroup Inc.
and J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.—have slashed such assets by well over
80% over a similar period. It will be another drag on the banks' capital and
returns on equity.
France's BNP Paribas SA is
sitting on €12.5 billion of asset-backed securities and collateralized debt
obligations tied to real-estate markets. The assets are liquid and "priced
very conservatively."
French banks in particular have
pointed to such sales as a key part of their plan to address a cumulative €8.8
billion capital shortfall.
The assets could lose value due
to a wave of selling by the banks. If the banks sell the assets at a loss, it
erodes their profits and can dent their capital bases. But if they don't sell
them, they're stuck with assets that consume significant quantities of capital.
Banks in the U.K., France and
Germany are the biggest holders of such assets, even after chipping away at
their exposures. The four biggest British banks reduced their holdings by more
than half since 2007, while four French banks trimmed theirs by less than 30%.
Barclays PLC is sitting on
about £17.9 billion as of Sept. 30, down from £23.9 billion at the start of the
year. The assets, which landed on the giant U.K. bank's books before mid-2007,
include collateralized debt obligations, composed of securities backed by
assets like mortgages, commercial real-estate loans and leveraged loans that
helped finance boom-era corporate buyout deals.
At roughly €28 billion, Crédit
Agricole SA has the biggest portfolio of such assets among French banks. The
bank's June 30 financial report includes €8.6 billion of CDOs backed by U.S.
residential mortgages. On top of that, Crédit Agricole also has at least €1
billion of U.S. mortgage-backed securities, some composed of subprime loans.
With the U.S. real-estate market still hurting, further losses are possible in
all these securities.
Legacy assets are also
haunting Deutsche Bank AG. The bank is holding €2.9 billion in U.S.
residential mortgage assets, including subprime loans. It has an additional
€20.2 billion tied up in commercial mortgages and whole loans. The bank says it
has hedged nearly all of its residential mortgage exposure. Deutsche's exposure
to such assets amounts to more than 150% of its tangible equity—a key measure
of its ability to absorb unexpected losses.
Compared with European banks,
U.S. lenders have moved faster to dump such assets. Citigroup, which required
$45 billion of government aid in 2008, faced intense pressure from regulators
to rid itself of risky assets, many linked to mortgages that got the New York
bank in trouble. Its stockpile of such assets was down by 86% to $45 billion at
Sept. 30.
EXPOSURE OF U.S. Banks
- Goldman
Sachs Group Inc., the fifth- biggest U.S. bank by assets, had $2.32 billion
of “funded” credit exposure to Italy’s government, financial institutions and
companies as of Sept. 30.
- Morgan
Stanley’s net funded exposure tied to Italy was $1.79 billion at the end of
September, accounting for most of the $2.11 billion total from the five
countries.
- Citigroup
Inc.’s “net current funded exposure” tied to the PIIGS countries was $7.2
billion at the end of September, more than three times the exposure to Belgium
and France. Total cross-border claims linked to Italy were $14.5 billion.
- JPMorgan
Chase & Co.’s exposure to Italy from trading, lending and securities
available for sale was $11.3 billion as of Sept. 30.
- Bank of
America Corp.’s non-U.S. exposure linked to Italy was $6.54 billion at the
end of September, almost 45 percent of the total linked to the five European
countries.
PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES
The Eurozone is Over
If Greece did its own
thing and Germany its own, you need to have separate currencies. If Maharashtra
borrowed as much as the government of India on the assumption that it is a
sovereign power, the Indian rupee would collapse, too. The rupee holds only
because India limits the fiscal sovereignty of its states.
One can see the eurozone being
restricted to Germany, France and the Benelux countries, or the emergence of
two eurozones – with northern Europe being the stronger half with a stronger
euro and southern Europe – assuming it sticks together – having a weaker euro.
The southern euro, or successor national currencies, have to depreciate against
the northern ones, assuming the euro itself stays.
As the western world goes into
recession, it is the less externally-vulnerable countries that will benefit
most.
America will benefit, because it
imports more than it exports and it retains sovereignty over the dollar. A
global slowdown will bring down the price of its imports faster than the
slowdown in its export earnings.
India will benefit for the same
reason – and for the fact that it will still be growing faster than many other
countries.
The oil-producers (including
Russia) will gain because oil priced in dollars will not fall too much.
The biggest losers will be the
highly export-driven economies of Germany and China
These Countries will now have to
find markets in new areas. Or they will have to grow their internal consumption
markets through a painful process of saving less and spending more. All of them
will slow down dramatically – if not slip into recession.
LESSONS FROM THIS ALL
Globalisation and absolute
sovereignty are inimical to one another.
One or the other has to dominate.
If we want free trade, we cannot have political barriers to trade – and by
trade here means not only the export of goods and services, but also capital
and labour. Globalisation will work perfectly only if all the factors of
production move freely – and markets adjust constantly to this flow.
But this is an impossibility when
political power remains national. The euro experiment is failing because Europe
tried to graft a political project (to achieve a peaceful continent) based on
economic interdependence. It would have worked if Europe also had a sovereign
government which redistributed resources from the rich to the poor. In such a
scenario, Germany would subsidise Greece and the other PIIGs to
improve their economic conditions and competitive abilities. Eurozone is
failing because this did not happen – and Germany hogged the benefits as long
as it could.
Countries running excess
fiscal and current account deficits over long periods of times will get into
serious trouble.
But the reverse is also true.
Countries running external surpluses for long periods of time are equally the
cause of the problem. This has been the world’s blind spot so far where
exporters and surplus countries were hailed as heroes and the rest castigated
as zeroes and wasteful. The latter characterisation is rubbish: borrowers need
lenders, and if borrowers keep on borrowing, it is because the lenders benefit
from it.
Put another way, it means when
countries run prolonged deficits, both parties – the surplus economies and the
deficit ones – must do opposite things. The adjustment cannot be done by the
deficit people alone. By wrongly categorising Germany, China and Japan as
surplus heroes a lopsided world is created in which they were being eulogised
for being “virtuous savers” when the “profligate” spenders were actually
responsible for their growth.
The world’s problems will be
solved today only if the saver economies now agree to spend lavishly (instead
of lending) to right the balance. They will have to do this by sacrificing some
of their old firepower and growth.
Welfarism has serious limits
Both the US and Europe are
capitalist economies that took on excessive burdens on social security – Europe
more than the US – which cannot be sustained by economic activity. The US
economy is sinking under the weight of its unaffordable social security (mainly
medical benefits) and pensions. Europe – where the welfare state is even worse.
Till recently, Europe’s inflexible economy was willing to tolerate high
unemployment by doling out more by way of state benefits. This is
unsustainable.


















